Soviet Diplomacy and the Comintern 1921-1927 by Kocho-Williams, Alastair
Aberystwyth University
Soviet Diplomacy and the Comintern 1921-1927
Kocho-Williams, Alastair
Published in:
Historical Journal
Publication date:
2013
Citation for published version (APA):
Kocho-Williams, A. (2013). Soviet Diplomacy and the Comintern 1921-1927. Historical Journal, 1-36.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 09. Jul. 2020
SOVIET DIPLOMACY AND THE COMINTERN 1921-1927* 
ALASTAIR KOCHO-WILLIAMS 
 
Abstract 
During the 1920s the Soviets pursued two fronts in their foreign relations – 
diplomacy, aimed at integration with the international community and the export of 
revolution via propaganda conducted by the Comintern.  These aims were at odds 
with one another to the point of being mutually exclusive, creating problems for the 
Soviet attempt to engage diplomatically with the world.  This article explores how 
the move towards the normalisation of diplomatic relations was achieved by the 
Soviets, discussing the priorities for foreign trade and security such that the Soviet 
state could develop, the Soviet attendance at world conferences and process of 
achieving diplomatic recognition, the displacement of rivals in the diplomatic arena, 
and the problems that foreign propaganda and the Comintern posed in achieving this 
end. 
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The 1920s was an era of change and compromise for Soviet diplomacy as the 
imperatives of Soviet foreign relations were realigned away from revolution towards 
the pursuit of stable diplomatic relations.  Even so, while diplomats and the People’s 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (hereafter Narkomindel) took steps to secure 
formal relations with foreign powers, the Comintern (Third International) continued 
to engage in foreign propaganda – that is propaganda conducted in foreign states – 
in an effort to spread the worldwide revolution. These two strains of Soviet foreign 
affairs were at odds with one another, to the point of being mutually exclusive.  This 
article will examine Soviet diplomacy as it evolved during the 1920s, as well as the 
problems posed for it by the Comintern. The development of Soviet diplomacy in 
the decade can be seen to have several distinct aspects: the establishment of trade 
relations leading to formal recognition, engagement in international conferences and 
conforming to the norms of diplomatic society, displacing rivals on the international 
stage, and the harm done to Soviet diplomacy by the Comintern. 
 Although some elements of the article have been discussed in earlier works, 
this article differs in a number of ways to previous scholarship on the topic.  
Accounts have acknowledged the two paths of Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s – 
both alone and together – and the Soviet drive for normalization in relations with 
other states.  None have dealt satisfactorily with the behavioural aspect of 
integration, with the need to displace a rival Russian diplomatic body, or with the 
Narkomindel’s powerlessness to change diplomacy or restrict propaganda activity 
conducted through and outside of diplomacy.  Nor have other works addressed the 
Soviet acceptance of the rules and norms of diplomatic society, and how Soviet 
diplomats came into line with them during the 1920s.1 
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The aims of Soviet diplomacy in the 1920s were to secure recognition from 
foreign powers, in order to emerge on the diplomatic scene as a fully accepted and 
functioning state equal to the world’s great powers, and to allow the Soviet Union 
the opportunity to develop economically by opening and maintaining channels for 
international trade. The extent to which Soviet diplomacy had to change and 
compromise its revolutionary aspects is central to the realignment of Soviet 
diplomacy during the 1920s.  
 In the 1920s there was a change in the attitudes of both the regime and of 
individual diplomats.  After October 1917 the Soviets had shown a desire to use 
diplomacy as a means to export the Russian Revolution, using diplomatic privileges 
as a front for propaganda and agitation.  During 1918 they were to discover that this 
strategy created problems for their acceptance as diplomats, with missions expelled 
from Germany and Switzerland after being caught with propaganda materials.  A 
new tack was adopted, of taking the agitational elements from the Narkomindel, 
both as personnel and behaviour, and passing them to the newly founded Comintern 
in March 1919. Following the Russian Civil War, there was a further shift in Soviet 
diplomacy’s aims – moving towards a policy designed to gain recognition,.2  At the 
same time, it had become clear to foreign powers that the Soviet state was not going 
to collapse, as had been hoped, and that there was a very real need, at least on 
economic grounds, to engage with this new Russia.  
The major diplomatic aim of the 1920s for the Soviets was to achieve de jure 
diplomatic recognition by foreign powers.  A new respectability – such that the 
Soviets would be seen as acceptable diplomats, not revolutionaries – was necessary 
for this.  Essential to this was a move away from illegal revolutionary activity, and 
sustained attempts to disassociate the Soviet state from the Comintern.3  The Soviet 
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Union’s diplomats were to prove that they could be dealt with, and that they should 
be considered equal to their foreign counterparts.  Even when they flouted 
convention, they were at pains to deny and to limit the damage they had done.4  The 
1920s saw the return of Russia as a major power to the European diplomatic arena, 
albeit a revolutionary one.   
  One of the first steps towards achieving diplomatic recognition and 
acceptance in the international community was the establishment of foreign trade.  
The Soviet state wanted to establish trade with other states for two reasons: Russia 
had a real need to expand its overseas trade as an economic necessity, and trade 
could be used as a prelude to formal diplomatic relations with a foreign power.  
Bolshevik policy rested on building the Soviet economy by catching up with, and 
eventually overtaking, the western industrial powers.  Industry could only grow, 
however, if Russia was able to import materials needed for this expansion and 
export the goods produced.  In conjunction with this, the desire to expand trade was 
encouraged by the New Economic Policy (NEP), which promoted the use of market 
mechanisms, albeit limited in crucial ways, and internal trade in order to modernize 
and industrialize Russia in the 1920s.  This was a product of the realization that the 
hoped-for worldwide revolution was not going to happen; the Soviet state needed to 
work on building and strengthening itself, by at least temporarily, establishing a 
dialogue with foreign imperialist powers through a more traditional approach to 
diplomacy in order to provide the opportunity to do so.  Because of the need for 
foreign trade, a revised diplomatic approach was required.  Gone was the drive to 
instigate world revolution, which was replaced by a new possibility for peaceful 
coexistence and good relations with foreign powers, coupled with an expansion in 
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trade.  The Narkomindel found it necessary to establish trade relations and to 
convert its quasi-diplomatic institutions into diplomatic missions in foreign states.5 
The move towards establishing trade relations as a prelude to more formal 
diplomatic relations with the capitalist owers was flagged up by the Soviets in 1920 
when Foreign Commissar Georgii Chicherin instructed Leonid Krasin to use trade as 
a means of leverage in negotiations with British Prime Minister, David Lloyd-
George.6  The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement in 1921 granted 
the Soviet state its first recognition by any foreign power, and established a 
framework for relations between the two states.  While the Soviet state saw the trade 
agreement as being of a ‘temporary and insufficient character’ it nonetheless 
presented itself as an opportunity for the Soviets to develop diplomatic relations 
through the establishment of a dialogue with Britain, considered to be the leading 
capitalist power, based around trade and allowed for the establishment of a trade 
mission in Britain, with permission to use ciphers, have immunity, issue visas, and 
enjoy the rights afforded to official representatives of other governments.7  This 
agreement was expanded in 1924 into the Anglo-Soviet General Treaty and 
Commercial Agreement, granting the Soviet Union de jure recognition by Britain.8  
That the British had decided to enter into formal relations with the Soviet Union 
provided a stamp of acceptance, meaning that other powers might then see the 
Soviets as fit to enter into negotiations.  
This was a definite strategy and one which shows a change in the way Soviet 
diplomats were approaching foreign affairs.  Krasin pursued Soviet trade and 
diplomatic interests and espoused the normalization of trade relations with Britain in 
the belief that the expansion of Russia’s trade with other countries depended on 
good relations with the leading European economic power.9  At the same time, 
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Alexandra Kollontai recalled a conversation with General Secretary Josef Stalin in 
1922 in which he told her to pursue economic and trade relations with Norway in 
order that Britain might be brought to an agreement with the Soviet Union.10  Thus, 
the strategy of pursuing trade as a precursor to further diplomatic recognition can be 
clearly seen, and achieving agreement with Britain was seen as highly significant in 
the search for recognition by foreign powers.    
 While this was a Soviet opinion, the same view – that trade relations would 
lead to more formal diplomatic agreements – was not necessarily held by the Soviet 
Union’s prospective suitors.  From the British point of view, the Anglo-Russian 
Trade Agreement was motivated by their desire to establish trade with the Soviet 
state, and did not necessarily pave the way for further recognition.11  The French 
economist and politician Eduard Herriot’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1922, and his 
subsequent recommendation for the establishment of relations with the Soviets, was 
largely motivated by economic concerns.12  It is clear from this that foreign powers 
were keen to trade with the Soviet state, and not to be excluded from any trade 
agreements, lest they be left behind by other European powers, but did not see the 
link between trade and diplomacy in quite the same way as the Soviets. 
 Despite this discrepancy of opinion, economic factors were to prove useful in 
the Soviet drive for recognition.  It is possible that the Soviets realized, in their 
Marxist reading of politics, that foreign states in the 1920s were extremely interested 
in economic power, and that playing on this interest might be a means to exploit the 
weaknesses of the capitalist imperial powers, not least the divisions between them.13  
In this light it is necessary to examine the first conference of the 1920s that the 
Soviets attended, thereby embarking on their journey to full recognition.   
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The Genoa Conference of April 10–May 19, 1922 heralded the Soviet state’s 
indisputable arrival on the stage of international diplomacy, and revealed much as to 
how Soviet diplomats were beginning to come into line with the norms of diplomatic 
society, such that they would be accepted into it.  The conference was convened to 
discuss Russia’s debts, and potential Soviet repayment of them.14  From the Soviet 
point of view, the Genoa Conference presented an opportunity to work towards 
recognition by foreign powers and a chance to show the world that they had 
achieved the necessary level of respectability to move in conventional diplomatic 
circles.15  Tsarist diplomats, still representing a Russia that no longer existed, clearly 
felt that the Genoa Conference heralded Soviet recognition by foreign powers, at the 
expense of continued recognition of Tsarist Russia’s remaining missions under the 
émigré Council of Ambassadors.16  What Konstantin Nabokov had seen as 
inevitable in 1919 – that the ‘position of diplomats in Entente capitals would soon 
become untenable’ – was now becoming a reality.17  Although the issue of debts was 
clearly important for the capitalist powers, in particular Britain and France, the 
matters discussed at the conference were less important than the fact that the 
conference included the Soviet Union, and not the Council of Ambassadors.   
Initially, it seemed that Vladimir Lenin, the Soviet leader, would lead the 
delegation to Genoa himself, and his last minute decision not to go demonstrates that 
he felt little would be gained from the conference politically.18  Indeed, Chicherin 
questioned whether a Soviet delegation should be sent at all, given that directions 
from Lenin, regarding using the conference as an opportunity for propaganda, would 
merely serve to disrupt the conference.19  In the end it was led by Chicherin, 
accompanied by Maxim Litvinov, Adolf Ioffe, Leonid Krasin and Vatslav 
Vorovsky.  Litvinov was personally briefed by Lenin to be cautious and to watch 
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Chicherin, lest he broker a deal that was detrimental to the Soviet state for the sake 
of achieving further recognition.20  They were warned not to be in hurry to conclude 
any agreements for the sake of re-entry into European diplomacy, although Lenin 
sanctioned the conclusion of a bona fide treaty with Weimar Germany, with whom 
preliminary moves had already been made.21  It appears that the Soviets’ aim lay in 
making the Soviet Union’s presence felt and demonstrating to the world that Soviet 
diplomats were equal to their foreign counterparts. Popular opinion, shown in the 
Soviet press, saw the invitation to Genoa as a ‘major moral victory’.22  By attending 
the conference, Soviet diplomats were making a statement that Russia had returned 
to the negotiating table. 
 The Soviet decision on who should attend the conference sheds light on how 
Soviet diplomacy was changing.  Lenin’s attendance, and the use of the conference 
to disseminate propaganda, were clearly not viable actions within diplomacy and 
Chicherin, and probably others, realized this.  More significant as a sign of the 
prevailing Soviet diplomatic culture in this instance is that Soviet diplomats, in 
particular Chicherin, desired Soviet entry into official diplomacy, and Lenin clearly 
feared that this goal could in fact be harmful to the revolutionary aspirations of the 
Soviet Union, and be seen as a betrayal of its values and ideology.  To be sure 
though, the very presence of a Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference which 
showed itself ready and suitable to be involved in diplomacy with other powers was 
enough to demonstrate that the Soviet Union’s diplomats had acquired an 
understanding of what was needed for Soviet acceptance into diplomatic society.  
Thus, it was important that the Soviet delegation sent out the right message to the 
diplomatic community regarding its intentions, not with respect to foreign policy, 
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but that they were prepared to play by diplomacy’s rules, share in its values, and join 
the international diplomatic community. 
 A large part of Soviet attendance at Genoa was about sending the diplomatic 
community the right message, and making a good impression, and as a result they 
needed to show that they could present themselves successfully to the diplomatic 
world.  The other representatives viewed the Soviet delegation with curiosity.  Their 
outward appearance did not seem to be ‘different’ – all appeared in conventional 
diplomatic garb.23  Photographs of Soviet delegates to the Genoa conference show 
them conforming to the norms of diplomatic dress – top hats and frock coats (see 
photographs, figs. 1 and 2 below).  The adherence to diplomatic dress codes is 
significant as it demonstrates that the Soviet delegation were making concessions in 
their dress in order to present themselves as suitable individuals to be involved in 
diplomacy.  As Roland Barthes notes, outward signals such as dress or costume give 
an indication of what can be expected from an individual and his behaviour.24  That 
the Soviet delegation were prepared to compromise on dress – Soviet diplomats had 
previously been instructed in a manner suitable for representatives of a workers’ and 
peasants’ state – must have indicated to foreign diplomats at the Genoa Conference 
that the Soviet Union was serious about joining the ranks of diplomatic society and 
was prepared to make concessions in order to do so, and signalled that further 
compliance could be expected.25  Indeed, the Soviet delegates’ behaviour did fit with 
the expectation provided by their dress as, according to Pope who claims his 
information came from observers at the time, their ‘behaviour was formal, stiff, 
correct’ and their ‘manners’ were impeccable.26 Soviet diplomats had learnt the 
lessons of the previous years – no longer could they flout convention and they 
needed to play the part of the diplomat if they were to be accepted by the 
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international diplomatic community.  This represents more than just a realization on 
the Soviet part that they needed to follow certain rules.  It was a clear signal that 
Soviet diplomacy was changing, that domestic desires and international restriction 
were shaping it, and that ideological concerns were to some extent being sacrificed 
for pragmatic ends. 
  
 
Fig. 1. 
Soviet delegates en route to Genoa in 1922.  From left: Chicherin, Radek, Litvinov, Bratmann-
Brodovski (Photograph courtesy of Roger-Viollet) 
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Fig. 2. Soviet Delegates at the Genoa Conference 
(in foreground from left Rudzutak, Chicherin, Krasin, Litvinov, Ioffe) 
(Photograph courtesy of Roger-Viollet) 
 
The effect that the Soviet delegation had at Genoa was enormous.  They 
scored a major coup at the conference – the right to have a seat on each of the four 
subcommittees, including those not set up to discuss specifically Russian affairs at 
the conference – effectively reinstating Russia as one of the great powers of Europe. 
In addition, on 16 April 1922 they secretly signed the Treaty of Rapallo with 
Weimar Germany, which effectively brought the Genoa conference to a close.  
Other foreign diplomats were outraged, feeling that the conference had been 
undermined by Soviet secrecy. The Soviets had gained a resumption of full 
diplomatic and consular relations with Germany and a regulation of economic 
relations on a basis of mutual cooperation.  According to third-party observers, 
Rapallo was innocuous and did not represent any concrete alliance.  In concluding 
formal diplomatic relations with Germany, however, the Soviet Union had 
established itself as the legitimate representative of Russia.27    
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 The conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty and the Soviet behaviour at the Genoa 
Conference demonstrated that Soviet diplomacy was practical and goal-orientated – 
the Soviets knew what they wanted to achieve and by this point understood the 
concessions they needed to make to do so, even if this meant compromising ideals 
and adhering to diplomacy’s rules.  In this light, even if Rapallo was of limited 
significance as an alliance, its significance as a major coup on the road to 
recognition for the Soviet state is undeniable: it confirmed the reorientation of 
Soviet diplomacy towards gaining diplomatic status for diplomatic purposes, rather 
than as a means to further the revolution.  Soviet diplomats were keen to secure 
Russia’s re-entry into a world from which she had been excluded, and they were 
willing to compromise their ideology in order to achieve it.   
 The Genoa Conference’s importance as the beginning of the road to official 
recognition is signalled not only by the acceptance of Soviet diplomats but also by 
the evaporation of the remaining power of the Council of Ambassadors.  Soviet 
diplomats had aimed since the revolution to displace Russia’s former diplomats and 
Genoa was the first of several serious blows to the Council’s remaining power.28  
Not only were their protests at the Soviet presence at Genoa ignored, but they were 
not invited, even as spectators, as they had been at the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919.29  They were allowed no advisory committee to consult with the delegates, 
and were effectively shut out from any discussion of Russian affairs with foreign 
powers.30  When Vasilii Maklakov, former Ambassador to Paris and one of the 
Council of Ambassadors’ central members, tried to advise the French government he 
was rudely told that they had no need for the advice of émigré ‘specialists’.31  
Evidently, with the Soviet arrival on the international scene, beginning with the 
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Genoa Conference, the Council of Ambassadors was fast losing its influence upon 
the capitalist powers.   
 Meanwhile, as former Tsarist diplomats watched their influence and power 
slip away, the Soviets were gaining confidence as a result of their involvement at 
Genoa. They had made their debut on the international diplomatic scene and could 
now be dealt with at further conferences.  This demonstrated the ascendancy of the 
Narkomindel, and the Soviet Union, in the diplomatic arena.  The Hague Conference 
(June - July 1922) and then the Lausanne Conference (November 1922 - February 
1923), convened to discuss the Straits question regarding access to the Black Sea, 
made clear that foreign powers would from that point negotiate with Soviet, rather 
than White, representatives regarding Russia.32  Maklakov was incensed, clearly 
concerned that this signalled the impending recognition of the Soviet State (both 
Genoa and The Hague conferences had collapsed, but he believed a discussion of the 
Straits question was clearly going to result in a treaty).  Maklakov voiced concerns 
that the Soviet delegation would give concessions in order to be included as a 
signatory on a major international treaty, and thereby achieve recognition.33   
Despite the fact that Soviet diplomats had clearly become the diplomatic 
agents of Russia, the Council of Ambassadors refused to cease their attempts to act 
as Russia’s representatives, and continued to have some influence with the French 
government.34  As the Council of Ambassadors lost any credible influence, however, 
it was not the Bolsheviks who dealt the Council of Ambassadors its death blow, but 
rather a French economist and politician, Eduard Herriot.  At the invitation of the 
Soviet leadership, Herriot travelled to Russia, meeting with Soviet officials in 
September and October 1922.35  Interested in economic issues, he returned to France 
with recommendations to resume relations with the communist regime in Russia, 
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beginning with the establishment of trade relations and the exchange of missions, 
but expanding into complete diplomatic relations.36 
 Despite this, and despite the Soviet participation at international conferences, 
the Council of Ambassadors continued its attempts to interfere in diplomatic 
matters, although it was becoming increasingly apparent to the capitalist powers that 
it was providing a heavily skewed picture of Russia, even to the extent of 
fabrication.  Senator de Monzie, following his visit to the Soviet Union in February 
1923, launched an attack on the Council of Ambassadors and their tendency to 
interfere, asking ‘is it too much to expect that Frenchmen should be able to discuss 
Franco-Russian relations on the basis of French interests, without the blatant 
interference of Russian refugee elements?’  Instead, he asked for ‘the freedom to 
consider the possibility of resuming relations with Russia without having to consult 
with Mr. Kokovstev or Miliukov’, who had ‘inordinate influence […] with the 
‘Russian Specialists’ at the Quai d’Orsay’.37  France remained the last great power 
in Europe not to recognize the Soviet Union; however, continued association with 
the Council of Ambassadors was harming French interests by keeping France at a 
distance from others in European diplomacy and in the ‘American camp’, where she 
could not stay forever.38  The start of the withdrawal of recognition began in 
December 1922, when the Quai d’Orsay announced that as of 1 January 1923 the 
names of Russian (i.e. non-Soviet) diplomatic personnel would no longer appear on 
the Diplomatic Lists.  The Council of Ambassadors started to prepare for the official 
establishment of Franco-Soviet relations, and to address the issue of how to 
represent émigré matters thereafter.  Prior to recognition, the French government 
assured Maklakov that he would be allowed to retain certain privileges afforded to 
White Consuls, such as issuing documents and passports (Nansen Passports for 
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stateless individuals) and handling legal questions involving émigré rights.39  
Despite these last vestiges of diplomatic status, Maklakov was informed on 27 
October 1924 that the Soviet state would take possession of the embassy the next 
day, with France regarding the Soviet Union as the legitimate owners should there 
be any dispute over ownership.40  The embassy was swiftly evacuated, leaving the 
archive behind (to Maklakov’s disappointment), thereby bringing the Council of 
Ambassador’s official presence in an Entente capital to a close and leaving the 
former Ambassadors of Russia in a state where ‘all ideals had been compromised, 
all principles made ridiculous, all leaders dethroned, all hope failed, all unity 
lost…and the very soil gone from under foot’.41  In losing their official position as 
representatives of Russia, although they continued to serve émigré interests, the 
former Tsarist diplomats had been totally marginalized. 
 While the displacement of the Council of Ambassadors as Russia’s 
representative was clearly a major step in the recognition process, how the process 
was handled, and indeed the aims of formal acceptance into diplomatic society 
demonstrated the shift in Soviet diplomacy away from revolution and towards more 
pragmatic behaviour.  Recognition was more than just an aim to be achieved by 
diplomats – what lay behind it was the goal of ensuring stability for the Soviet 
Union with the outside world such that it could develop internally.  As can be seen 
domestically by the end of the Civil War, with the NEP, the failure of the German 
Revolution of 1923, and with Stalin’s proclamation of building of ‘socialism in one 
country’, the Soviet regime’s priorities had changed.  This caused a shift in Soviet 
diplomacy that is well expressed in the light of the recognition process.  Chicherin 
himself, referring to his Tsarist predecessor, Alexander Gorchakov, sought stability 
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in Soviet international relations such that domestic policies could be acted upon 
without external distractions.42 
 The process shows another change in Soviet diplomacy, less policy-based 
than that mentioned above.  While there was a desire to achieve accommodation 
with the capitalist powers, the means to achieve it were dictated by rules that were 
beyond the Soviets’ power to change.  Only by entering into formal diplomacy and 
following its established rules could the Soviets hope to achieve their ends.  Thus, 
we see the Soviets displaying their mastery of diplomatic norms at international 
conferences and the expression of intentions to be dealt with as equals.  In doing so, 
Soviet diplomats elevated themselves into a more suitable position than they had 
previously occupied, leading to recognition by other powers. 
 It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between these two shifts surrounding 
the recognition process.  Soviet desire to achieve recognition was the catalyst for the 
realignment, as diplomats came to realize that they needed to pursue a line of 
traditional diplomacy, and abandon using it for revolutionary purposes, to achieve 
stability in foreign relations.  The goal-orientated approach of the Soviets led them 
to change, as international society continued to be resistant to any level of change 
that might be exerted on it.  Non-conformism could only lead to the Soviets 
functioning outside standard channels, or only very ineffectively within them, as 
foreign governments shunned them as unsuitable.  The shift in Soviet thinking and 
beahviour brought Soviet diplomats in line with diplomatic society as they showed 
themselves capable of adhering to its rules and others became prepared to engage 
with them.43 
 
 17 
 The biggest obstacle to securing recognition and maintaining good relations 
with foreign powers remained foreign propaganda conducted by the Comintern, 
frequently through the Narkomindel.  The Soviets had been aware that such 
behaviour was unacceptable within diplomacy, but had in the immediate post-
revolutionary period attempted to subvert diplomacy to revolutionary ends. 44  The 
Soviets had also discovered that foreign powers would deny them diplomatic rights 
and privileges on the basis of the suspicion that they were involved in revolutionary 
activity, and this had been a common theme of the period following the Revolution.  
In 1918 Berzin was delayed in Berlin, because the Swiss government would not 
issue any visas to the staff of the mission without the assurance that there were no 
agitators among them.45  Litvinov was denied the use of telegraphs and ciphers out 
of fear that he would use them to carry out illicit party business.46  Vorovsky was 
denied the use of ciphers and couriers in Sweden on the grounds that representatives 
of the Soviet government had abused diplomatic privileges and used them for 
disseminating propaganda in several countries and held the expectation that 
Vorovsky’s mission to Sweden involved propaganda as one of its chief aims.47  
The involvement of an individual in propaganda activity was also used by 
foreign powers as a means to deny them entry into a country to serve as a diplomat.   
The British Government affirmed in a reply to Krasin (then head of the Soviet Trade 
Delegation to Britain) that it had ‘no intention of debarring any Russian on the 
ground of his communist opinions provided the agents of the Russian government 
comply with the normal conditions for friendly international intercourse’.48  Using 
this as a basis, the British denied Lev Kamenev’s re-entry into Britain, stating that 
Kamenev had ‘engaged in almost open propaganda and attempted to subsidise a 
campaign in England against the British Constitution and British institutions’.49  
 18 
While it is clear from this that the British government felt that they had evidence of 
Kamenev having been involved in propaganda on their territory, there is a definite 
sense that they perceived Kamenev as just one example of a Soviet diplomat 
engaged in illicit propaganda activity at the time.  Britain repeatedly demanded that 
the Soviet state desist from propaganda, both in the British Isles and within the 
British Empire and Commonwealth.50 
Other instances displayed the suspicion on the part of foreign governments 
that the spread of revolution was the true aim of the Soviet diplomatic service. This 
was grounded in prior examples of Soviet diplomacy, where propaganda had been 
carried out by individuals accredited to the Narkomindel and their beliefs provided 
foreign host governments with a pretext to control and expel Soviet diplomatic 
missions from their countries.  Prior to granting the Berzin mission the right to enter 
Switzerland, the Swiss government exhibited a great deal of concern that there might 
be agitators within the mission’s staff and asked for assurances that there would not 
be.51  In a meeting on 17 May 1923, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and 
Krasin discussed the issue of suspicion held by the British government that the 
Soviet Trade Delegation had been engaging in propaganda from the beginning of its 
existence in Britain.  Indeed, the accusation was that the first condition of the Soviet 
Trade Agreement had been ‘systematically violated’.  The British government 
demanded that ‘the two Russian officials principally implicated should be disowned 
and recalled, and an apology offered for their misdeeds’.  Refusal would be seen as 
‘inconsistent with the established cannons of international intercourse’ and a rupture 
of relations was threatened as the likely outcome.52  
Suspicion shows itself to have been an almost constant factor in the 
relationship between Soviet diplomatic missions and their host nations in the early 
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years of Soviet diplomatic activity.  In 1923, Litvinov attacked the ‘suspiciousness 
of the British Government’ towards the Soviet Trade Delegation.53  In Switzerland 
there is clear evidence of the persistent suspicion that the Soviet mission in Bern was 
engaged heavily in propaganda.54  All this created a discourse of suspicion of the 
Soviet diplomatic service, which was used to hold it in check, while conversely 
being used by the Soviets to claim that they were being treated unjustly by the host 
nation.55  Foreign powers were concerned about the Soviet subversion of diplomacy, 
and had good reason to be.  By 1924, however, the Narkomindel’s primary concern 
was establishing diplomatic relations, and the necessary compromise on propaganda 
had been made.  Soviet diplomats were attempting to engage in diplomacy according 
to its rules, no longer trying to subvert them.  
  While the Narkomindel and Soviet diplomats had made definite shifts in 
policy and activities to ensure that their diplomacy was no longer the diplomacy of 
revolution, the regime had not entirely given up on propaganda being organized 
through Soviet embassies.56  The Comintern, although an agency distinct from the 
Narkomindel and composed of Communist parties from a wide range of countries, 
used Soviet diplomatic missions as a means to insert individuals into various places 
leading to problems and a resentment of propagandists by Soviet diplomats as a 
result of the challenges it posed to maintaining normal diplomatic relations. 
The Narkomindel and Soviet diplomats made concerted and repeated efforts 
to distance themselves from the Comintern and propaganda activities.  As an 
institution the Narkomindel was adamant that it could not be connected to the 
Comintern, instructed diplomats not to be involved in propaganda lest there be an 
impact on diplomatic relations, and removed all mention of Comintern activities 
from entries in the publication of Diplomaticheskii slovar’.57 This was challenging 
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as the Comintern contained a striking number of those who had served in the 
Narkomindel in its early days, and Soviet diplomats about to assume posts abroad 
were briefed not only by the Narkomindel, but also by the Comintern.58   
Additionally, it would appear that no matter how much the Narkomindel and its 
officials protested that there was no link between the two foreign governments were 
never convinced by the claims.59 
The presence of Comintern agencies within embassies caused a great number 
of problems for the Narkomindel, not to mention clashes between individuals and 
the two organizations.  The major problem arose because the Comintern needed 
diplomatic immunity and privileges (including the ability to pass materials for its 
revolutionary activity through diplomatic pouches) in order to carry out its work, 
while at the same time the Narkomindel needed to distance itself from ‘illegal party 
business’.60   
 The tension between the two agencies is clear, and Chicherin himself 
referred to the Comintern, in his final letter as Foreign Commissar in early July 
1930, as the Narkomindel’s number one internal enemy (‘iz […] vnutrennikh vragov 
– pervyi’).61  He attacked the Comintern’s involvement in the Narkomindel, 
claiming that the link between the Comintern and the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union was never a secret, and that it jeopardized the maintenance of embassies, 
trade missions, economic arrangements and press agencies.62  Even though he had 
been a delegate to the First Congress of the Comintern in 1919, he felt from the 
outset that the Comintern was at loggerheads with the establishment of a traditional 
style of diplomacy and was opposed to the accreditation of one agent per mission.63   
He had, however, little choice in these matters as the Politburo had ordered that he 
liaise with Grigorii Zinoviev, head of the Comintern in 1921, in order to attempt to 
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produce a working relationship between the Comintern and the Narkomindel.64  
Chicherin received a great deal of information regarding the Comintern from the 
Politburo and there was communication between the Comintern and the 
Narkomindel on numerous occasions, and from this standpoint it is inconceivable 
that the Narkomindel was unaware of the Comintern’s general activities, although 
restrictions of circulation of Politburo material and censorship probably meant that 
the Narkomindel was unaware of the specifics of Comintern activity.65  Despite 
being informed of the Comintern’s actions both by the Politburo and by Comintern 
officials, Chicherin appears to have only tacitly agreed with the Politburo’s 
instructions.66  It was of course essential that he played no role in Comintern activity 
himself in the midst of the drive for recognition, even if he was aware of its presence 
in his embassies.   
Even so, the Narkomindel was unable to limit the damage done to Soviet 
relations with other powers by the Comintern.  The British, concerned about the 
issue of propaganda directed against Britain and her worldwide interests, accused 
them of breaking the terms of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement ‘almost from the 
start’ and issued repeated warnings that the Soviets should desist from their 
propaganda activities before matters came to a head with the Curzon Ultimatum of 8 
May 1923,  which  accused the Soviet Union of continuing to engage in propaganda 
in both Britain and the British Empire, having ‘systematically violated’ the terms of 
the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement.67  Although the British government was aware 
that there was a drop in propaganda activity as a result of the trade agreement, it had 
not ceased altogether.68  The British appear to have remained concerned that 
propaganda in Asia, particularly in China, was a serious risk to British interests and 
they took steps to minimize it.  The Curzon Ultimatum must be seen as something of 
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a warning shot from the British, but not one that the Soviets took as seriously as they 
should have, given the rupture that would eventually occur in Anglo-Soviet 
relations. The primary reason why the break between Britain and the Soviet Union 
did not follow immediately on the heels of the Curzon Ultimatum probably had 
more to do with the Labour Party’s accession to power in Britain in 1924 than it did 
with a decrease in Soviet propaganda. 69   
Although the Narkomindel fiercely protested its lack of involvement in 
propaganda, there were solid grounds for British suspicions about Soviet 
revolutionary activity, and indeed it was not unusual for other states to view the 
Soviets in such a manner. Following the Russian Revolution a number of states had 
suspected, or had actually caught the Soviets abusing diplomatic privileges for 
revolutionary ends.70 Further, the Soviet Trade Delegation in London had been used 
to get Comintern agents into Britain, as well as to purchase space for its operations, 
and the regime remained concerned with overseas missions as bastions of 
revolutionary activity, according to the British and Soviet press.71  While Soviet 
diplomats were aware of the need to steer clear of propaganda and agitation, or to at 
least keep it hidden, they failed, as had been the case earlier, to be successful in all 
cases.72   
While the Curzon Ultimatum had been a warning about the detrimental 
impact of Soviet foreign propaganda, the Zinoviev letter of 1924, although a forgery, 
only served to make matters worse for the Soviets.73  When confronted, the Soviets 
denied the accusations, claiming that they had no knowledge of agents supposedly 
operating through the Trade Delegation in an illegal manner.  Insistent that there was 
no involvement in anti-British propaganda, the Politburo instructed the Narkomindel 
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to order Krasin to prepare to leave Britain in protest, presumably as they believed 
there was an impending rupture in diplomatic relations.74  
There was no rupture at this point, but the events of April and May 1927, 
following a British accusation in February that the Soviets were conducting ‘anti-
British propaganda’, were to prove the reality of the British threat to break off 
relations if the Soviets continued to be involved in revolutionary work, as the 
Comintern had been during the British General Strike of May 1926, in Britain and 
the British Empire.75  On the supposed evidence of Soviet revolutionary activity in 
China, which had been passed to the Foreign Office, the British raided the premises 
of the Soviet trading agency Arcos and the Soviet Trade Delegation in London 
between 12 and 16 May.76   The reason for the raid was a missing Air Ministry 
publication that the Soviets supposedly had in their possession.  The police found 
neither this document nor anything else of any real importance, but claimed to have 
found a list of ‘illegals’ in the possession of one employee.77  The British 
government subsequently published a White Paper containing documents found 
during the raid, as well as documents already amassed by the Foreign Office on the 
basis of which they drew conclusive proof that the Soviet Union was engaged in 
revolutionary subterfuge through the Trade Delegation and Arcos.78  Despite Soviet 
protests that there was no link between the Soviet Union and the Comintern, and 
their somewhat ironic complaints that the British had contravened diplomatic 
immunity in handling the matter, Britain subsequently broke off relations on 28 May 
1927, leading to renewed Soviet fears of capitalist encirclement and war and 
changes in Soviet domestic policy with the abandonment of the NEP and 
implementation of Stalin’s first Five Year Plan.79  
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The Narkomindel and Soviet diplomats were driven by the Soviet Union’s 
need in the 1920s to ensure that stable diplomatic relations were established with 
foreign powers.  In turn this need caused a realignment of Soviet diplomacy, as there 
was a marked shift in the priorities of diplomacy, with a corresponding change in the 
requirements of diplomatic behaviour.  During the 1920s, Soviet diplomats were 
intent on being properly accepted as members of diplomatic society and as a result 
needed to present themselves appropriately.  Taking the Genoa conference as a 
turning point, we see Soviet diplomats exhibited a clear awareness, and willingness, 
to conform to diplomatic conventions, signalling their desire to be taken seriously as 
diplomats.  No longer were the Soviets playing diplomacy by their own rules. 
 With the change in Soviet diplomatic goals the Narkomindel became far 
more a diplomatic than a revolutionary agency during the 1920s, and its staff 
changes reflected this.  The recruitment of a new wave of diplomats helped build an 
institution whose aim was representation and negotiation on behalf of the Soviet 
Union, rather than an agency charged with furthering the world revolution.80  This is 
not to say that revolutionary individuals no longer served in the Narkomindel, but 
the fact is that they had changed; diplomats who had been revolutionaries, such as 
Krasin and Berzin, eventually turned their backs on revolutionary activities in order 
to gain respectability as diplomats.   
For the Narkomindel, the 1920s brought a need for professional diplomats – 
individuals who were capable of fitting into and conforming to the rules of 
diplomatic society – who understood the priorities of diplomacy and how diplomatic 
relations should be conducted as a result of training and experience gained through 
service.  In this respect, Soviet diplomats came to resemble the diplomats of other 
countries as they outwardly displayed themselves to be conforming to its norms and 
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their mastery of diplomatic discourse and were able to displace the Council of 
Ambassadors that had challenged Soviet recognition following the Revolution. 
The expansion of foreign trade should be seen as facilitating Soviet 
recognition and diplomacy, both in terms of how the Soviet Union was treated by 
foreign powers and in how it treated its diplomatic agency.  Foreign trade was an 
imperative for the Soviet Union during the 1920s, and it could only be achieved 
through the establishment, and maintenance, of relations with foreign powers.  
Soviet diplomats, and the Politburo, were aware that trade relations could be used to 
provide a basis for formal diplomatic relations and worked towards this.  
Concurrently with this, foreign powers had a desire to trade with the Soviet Union 
and so became more disposed to the prospect of entering into official relations.  
Even countries that had been particularly resistant to Soviet recognition, such as 
France, took the route of establishing relations with the Soviet Union as a result of a 
desire to trade.  By the end of the 1920s, of the major powers only the United States 
had refused to recognize the Soviet Union.  
 Given the desire for stable diplomatic relations the Narkomindel was obliged 
to abandon the revolutionary activity it had been involved in immediately following 
the revolution. The Comintern inherited the role that the Narkomindel was obliged 
to cast off, becoming a representative agency for the revolutionary side of foreign 
affairs which the Central Committee was unwilling to abandon completely, and a 
significant number of Soviet diplomats of the post-revolutionary period had been 
involved in its establishment.  During the 1920s, the Comintern presented the 
Narkomindel with a host of problems, not least as a result of the presence of 
uncontrollable Comintern agents within foreign missions and the negative impact on 
diplomacy of Soviet foreign propaganda.  The Narkomindel struggled with outside 
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agencies that inserted agents into diplomatic missions.81  A lack of control over these 
individuals was one side of this, but far more important was the harm that 
individuals working for an agency not concerned with nurturing diplomatic relations 
could do.  What the Narkomindel needed in its missions was individuals focused 
solely on the furthering of diplomatic relations, and nothing else.  The regime was 
unwilling to abandon all hope of an international revolution, and there was a definite 
tension between the two aims of Soviet foreign relations in the 1920s as the regime 
attempted to engage the world on both fronts, culminating in raids on diplomatic 
premises, a rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain and the war scare of 1927.  It 
is clear that Soviet foreign propaganda could only harm relations, and in order to 
attempt to maintain diplomatic ties the Narkomindel and Soviet diplomats were 
obliged to take steps to limit the damage.  The events of 1927 show that ultimately 
they were unsuccessful in this role and the Comintern made the Narkomindel’s task 
of carving out a place for the Soviet Union in word affairs on the basis of formal, 
and friendly, diplomatic relations much more difficult. 
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